20 Mishaps That Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War
by Alan F. Philips, M.D.
Ever since the two adversaries in the Cold War, the U.S.A. an the U.S.S.R.,
realized that their nuclear arsenals were sufficient to do disastrous damage to both countries at short notice, the leaders
and the military commanders have thought about the possibility of a nuclear war starting without their intention or as a result
of a false alarm. Increasingly elaborate accessories have been incorporated in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems
to minimize the risk of unauthorized or accidental launch or detonation. A most innovative action was the establishment of
the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow in 1963 to reduce the risk of misunderstanding between the supreme commanders.
Despite all precautions, the possibility of an inadvertent war due to
an unpredicted sequence of events remained as a deadly threat to both countries and to the world. That is the reason I am
prepared to spend the rest of my life working for abolition of nuclear weapons.
One way a war could start is a false alarm via one of the warning systems,
followed by an increased level of nuclear forces readiness while the validity of the information was being checked. This action
would be detected by the other side, and they would take appropriate action; detection of the response would tend to confirm
the original false alarm; and so on to disaster. A similar sequence could result from an accidental nuclear explosion anywhere.
The risk of such a sequence developing would be increased if it happened during a period of increased international tension.
On the American side many "false alarms" and significant accidents have
been listed , ranging from trivial to very serious, during the Cold War . Probably many remain unknown to the public and the
research community because of individuals' desire to avoid blame and maintain the good reputation of their unit or command.
No doubt there have been as many mishaps on the Soviet Side.
Working with any new system, false alarms are more likely. The rising
moon was misinterpreted as a missile attack during the early days of long-range radar. A fire at a broken gas pipeline was
believed to be enemy jamming by laser of a satellite’s infrared sensor when those sensors were first deployed.
The risks are illustrated by the following selection of mishap. If the
people involved had exercised less caution, or if some unfortunate coincidental event had occurred, escalation to nuclear
war can easily be imagined. Details of some of the events differ in different sources: where there have been disagreements,
I have chosen to quote those from the carefully researched book, The Limits of Safety by Scott D. Sagan. Sagan gives
references to original sources in all instances.
The following selections represent only a fraction of the false alarms
that have been reported on the American side. Many probably remain unreported, or are hidden in records that remain classified.
There are likely to have been as many on the Soviet Side which are even more difficult to access.
1) November 5, 1956: Suez Crisis Coincidence
British and French Forces were attacking Egypt at the Suez Canal;. The
Soviet Government had suggested to the U.S. that they combine forces to stop this by a joint military action, and had warned
the British and French governments that (non-nuclear) rocket attacks on London and Paris were being considered. That night
NORAD HQ received messages that:
(i) unidentified aircraft were flying over Turkey and the Turkish air
force was on alert
(ii) 100 Soviet MIG-15's were flying over Syria
(iii) a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria
(iv) the Soviet fleet was moving through the Dardanelles.
It is reported that in the U.S.A. General Goodpaster himself was concerned
that these events might trigger the NATO operations plan for nuclear strikes against the U.S.S.R.
The four reports were all shown afterwards to have innocent explanations.
They were due, respectively, to:
(i) a flight of swans
(ii) a routine air force escort (much smaller than the number reported)
for the president of Syria, who was returning from a visit to Moscow
(iii) the Canberra bomber was forced down by mechanical problems
(iv) the Soviet fleet was engaged in scheduled routine exercises.
2) November 24, 1961: BMEWS Communication Failure
On the night of November 24, 1961, all communication links went dead
between SAC HQ and NORAD. The communication loss cut off SAC HQ from the three Ballistic Missile Early Warning Sites (BMEWS)
at Thule (Greenland,) Clear (Alaska,) and Fillingdales (England,). There were two possible explanations facing SAC HQ: either
enemy action, or the coincidental failure of all the communication systems, which had redundant and ostensibly independent
routes, including commercial telephone circuits. All SAC bases in the United States were therefore alerted, and B-52 bomber
crews started their engines, with instructions not to to take off without further orders. Radio communication was established
with an orbiting B-52 on airborne alert, near Thule. It contacted the BMEWS stations by radio and could report that no attack
had taken place.
The reason for the "coincidental" failure was the redundant routes for
telephone and telegraph between NORAD and SAC HQ all ran through one relay station in Colorado. At that relay station a motor
had overheated and caused interruption of all the lines.
3) August 23, 1962: B-52 Navigation Error
SAC Chrome Dome airborne alert route included a leg from the northern
tip of Ellesmore Island, SW across the Arctic Ocean to Barter Island, Alaska. On August 23, 1962, a B-52 nuclear armed bomber
crew made a navigational error and flew 20 degrees too far north. They approached within 300 miles of Soviet airspace near
Wrangel island, where there was believed to be an interceptor base with aircraft having an operational radius of 400 miles.
Because of the risk of repetition of such an error, in this northern
area where other checks on Navigation are difficult to obtain, it was decided to fly a less provocative route in the future.
However, the necessary orders had not been given by the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, so throughout that
crisis the same northern route was being flown 24 hours a day.
4) August-October, 1962: U2 Flights into Soviet Airspace
U2 high altitude reconnaissance flights from Alaska occasionally strayed
unintentionally into Soviet airspace. One such episode occurred in August 1962. During the Cuban missile crisis on October
of 1962, the U2 pilots were ordered not to fly within 100 miles of Soviet airspace.
On the night of October 26, for a reason irrelevant to the crisis, a
U2 pilot was ordered to fly a new route, over the north pole, where positional checks on navigation were by sextant only.
That night the aurora prevented good sextant readings and the plane strayed over the Chukotski Peninsula. Soviet MIG interceptors
took off with orders to shoot down the U2. The pilot contacted his U.S. command post and was ordered to fly due east towards
Alaska. He ran out of fuel while still over Siberia. In response to his S.O.S., U.S. F102-A fighters were launched to escort
him on his glide to Alaska, with orders to prevent the MIG's from entering U.S. airspace. The U.S. interceptor aircraft were
armed with nuclear missiles. These could have been used by any one of the F102-A pilots at his own discretion.
5) October 24, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: A Soviet Satellite Explodes
On October 24, a Soviet satellite entered its own parking orbit, and
shortly afterward exploded. Sir Bernard Lovell, director of the Jodrell Bank observatory wrote in 1968: "the explosion of
a Russian spacecraft in orbit during the Cuban missile crisis... led the U.S. to believe that the USSR was launching a massive
ICBM attack." The NORAD Command Post logs of the dates in question remain classified, possibly to conceal reaction to the
event. Its occurrence is recorded, and U.S. space tracking stations were informed on October 31 of debris resulting from the
breakup of "62 BETA IOTA."
6) October 25, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: Intruder in Duluth
At around midnight on October 25, a guard at the Duluth Sector Direction
Center saw a figure climbing the security fence. He shot at it, and activated the "sabotage alarm." This automatically set
off sabotage alarms at all bases in the area. At Volk Field, Wisconsin, the alarm was wrongly wired, and the Klaxon sounded
which ordered nuclear armed F-106A interceptors to take off. The pilots knew there would be no practice alert drills while
DEFCON 3 was in force, and they believed World War III had started.
Immediate communication with Duluth showed there was an error. By this
time aircraft were starting down the runway. A car raced from command center and successfully signaled the aircraft to stop.
The original intruder was a bear.
7) October 26, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: ICBM Test Launch
At Vandenburg Air Force Base, California, there was a program of routine
ICBM test flights. When DEFCON 3 was ordered all the ICBM's were fitted with nuclear warheads except one Titan missile that
was scheduled for a test launch later that week. That one was launched for its test, without further orders from Washington,
at 4a.m. on the 26th.
It must be assumed that Russian observers were monitoring U.S. missile
activities as closely as U.S. observers were monitoring Russian and Cuban activities. They would have known of the general
changeover to nuclear warheads, but not that this was only a test launch.
8) October 26, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: Unannounced Titan Missile
During the Cuba crisis, some radar warning stations that were under construction
and near completion were brought into full operation as fast as possible. The planned overlap of coverage was thus not always
A normal test launch of a Titan-II ICBM took place in the afternoon of
October 26, from Florida to the South Pacific. It caused temporary concern at Moorestown Radar site until its course could
be plotted and showed no predicted impact within the United States. It was not until after this event that the potential for
a serious false alarm was realized, and orders were given that radar warning sites must be notified in advance of test launches,
and the countdown be relayed to them.
9) October 26, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: Malstrom Air Force Base
When DEFCON 2 was declared on October 24, solid fuel Minuteman-1 missiles
at Malmstrom Air Force Base were being prepared for full deployment. The work was accelerated to ready the missiles for operation,
without waiting for the normal handover procedures and safety checks. When one silo and missile were ready on October 26 no
armed guards were available to cover transport from the normal separate storage, so the launch enabling equipment and codes
were all placed in the silo. It was thus physically possible for a single operator to launch a fully armed missile at a SIOP
During the remaining period of the Crisis the several missiles at Malstrom
were repeatedly put on and off alert as errors and defects were found and corrected. Fortunately no combination of errors
caused or threatened an unauthorized launch, but in the extreme tension of the period the danger can be well imagined.
10) October, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: NATO Readiness
It is recorded on October 22, that British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
and NATO Supreme Commander, General Lauris Norstad agreed not to put NATO on alert in order to avoid provocation of the U.S.S.R.
When the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered DEFCON 3 Norstad was authorized to use his discretion in complying. Norstad did
not order a NATO alert. However, several NATO subordinate commanders did order alerts to DEFCON 3 or equivalent levels
of readiness at bases in West Germany, Italy, Turkey, and United Kingdom. This seems largely due to the action of General
Truman Landon, CINC U.S. Air Forces Europe, who had already started alert procedures on October 17 in anticipation of a serious
crisis over Cuba.
11) October, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: British Alerts
When the U.S. SAC went to DEFCON 2, on October 24, Bomber Command (the
U.K.) was carrying out an unrelated readiness exercise. On October 26, Air Marshall Cross, CINC of Bomber Command, decided
to prolong the exercise because of the Cuba crisis, and later increased the alert status of British nuclear forces, so that
they could launch in 15 minutes.
It seems likely that Soviet intelligence would perceive these moves as
part of a coordinated plan in preparation for immediate war. They could not be expected to know that neither the British Minister
of Defense nor Prime Minister Macmillian had authorized them.
It is disturbing to note how little was learned from these errors in
Europe. McGeorge Bundy wrote in Danger and Survival (New York: Random House 1988), "the risk [of nuclear war] was small,
given the prudence and unchallenged final control of the two leaders."
12) October 28, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: Moorestown False Alarm
Just before 9 a.m., on October 28, the Moorestown, New Jersey, radar
operators informed the national command post that a nuclear attack was under way. A test tape simulating a missile launch
from Cuba was being run, and simultaneously a satellite came over the horizon.
Operators became confused and reported by voice line to NORAD HQ that
impact was expected 18 miles west of Tampa at 9:02 a.m. The whole of NORAD was reported, but before irrevocable action had
taken place it was reported that no detonation had taken place at the predicted time, and Moorestown operators reported the
reason for the false alarm.
During the incident overlapping radar’s that should have confirmed
or disagreed were not in operation . The radar post had not received routine information of satellite passage because the
facility carrying out that task had been given other work for the duration of the crisis.
13) October 28, 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis: False Warning Due to Satellite
At 5:26 p.m. on October 28, the Laredo radar warning site had just become
operational. Operators misidentified a satellite in orbit as two possible missiles over Georgia and reported by voice line
to NORAD HQ. NORAD was unable to identify that the warning came from the new station at Laredo and believed it to be from
Moorestown, and therefore more reliable. Moorestown failed to intervene and contradict the false warning. By the time the
CINC, NORAD had been informed, no impact had been reported and the warning was "given low credence."
14) November 2, 1962: The Penkovsky False Warning
In the fall of 1962, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky was working with the Soviets
as a double agent for the (U.S.) C.I.A. He had been given a code by which to warn the CIA if he was convinced that a Soviet
attack on the United States was imminent. He was to call twice, one minute apart, and only blow into the receiver. Further
information was then to be left at a "dead drop" in Moscow.
The pre-arranged code message was received by the CIA on November 2,
It was known at the CIA that Penkovsky had been arrested on October 22.
Penkovsky knew he was going to be executed. It is not known whether he had told the KGB the meaning of the code signal or
only how it would be given, nor is it known exactly why or with what authorization the KGB staff used it. When another CIA
agent checked the dead drop he was arrested.
15) November, 1965: Power Failure and Faulty Bomb Alarms
Special bomb alarms were installed near military facilities and near
cities in the U.S.A., so that the locations of nuclear bursts would be transmitted before the expected communication failure.
The alarm circuits were set up to display a red signal at command posts the instant that the flash of a nuclear detonation
reached the sensor and before the blast put it out of action. Normally the display would show a green signal, and yellow if
the sensor was not operating or was out of communication for any other reason.
During the commercial power failure in the NE United States, in November
1965, displays from all the bomb alarms for the area should have shown yellow. In fact, two of them from different cities
showed red because of circuit errors. The effect was consistent with the power failure being due to nuclear weapons explosions,
and the Command Center of the Office of Emergency Planning went on full alert. Apparently the military did not.
16) January 21, 1968: B-52 Crash near Thule
Communication between NORAD HQ and the BMEWS station at Thule had 3 elements:
1. Direct radio communication.
2. A "bomb alarm" as described above.
3. Radio Communication relayed by a b-52 bomber on airborne alert.
On January 21, 1968, a fire broke out in the b-52 bomber on airborne
alert near Thule. The pilot prepared for an emergency landing at the base. However the situation deteriorated rapidly, and
the crew had to bale out. There had been no time to communicate with SAC HQ, and the pilotless plane flew over the Thule base
before crashing on the ice 7 miles miles offshore. Its fuel and high explosive component of its nuclear weapons exploded,
but there was no nuclear detonation.
At that time, the "one point safe" condition of the nuclear weapons could
not be guaranteed, and it is believed that a nuclear explosion could have resulted form accidental detonation of the high
explosive trigger. Had there been a nuclear detonation even at 7 miles distant, and certainty much nearer the base, all three
communication methods would have given an indication consistent with a succsessful nuclear attack on both the base and the
B-52 bomber. The bomb alarm would have shown red, and the other two communication paths would have gone dead. It would hardly
have been anticipated that the combination could have been caused by accident, particularly as the map of the routes for B-52
airborne flights approved by the President showed no flight near to Thule. The route had been apparently changed without informing
the White House.
17) October 24-25, 1973: False Alarm During Middle East Crisis
On October 24, 1973, when the U.N. sponsored cease fire intended to end
the Arab-Israeli war was in force, further fighting stared between Egyptian and Israeli troops in the Sinai desert. U.S. intelligence
reports and other sources suggested that the U.S.S.R. was planning to intervene to protect the Egyptians. President Nixon
was in the throes of Watergate episode and not available for a conference, so Kissinger and other U.S. officials ordered DEFCON
3. The consequent movements of aircraft and troops were of course observed by Soviet intelligence. The purpose of the alert
was not to prepare for war, but to warn the U.S.S.R. not to intervene in the Sinai. However, if the following accident had
not been promptly corrected then the Soviet command might have had a more dangerous interpretation.
On October 25, while DEFCON 3 was in force, mechanics were repairing
one of the Klaxons at Kinchole Air Force Base, Michigan, and accidentally activated the whole base alarm system. B-52 crews
rushed to their aircraft and started the engines. The duty officer recognized the alarm was false and recalled the crews before
any took off.
18) November 9, 1979: Computer Exercise Tape
At 8:50 a.m. on November 9, 1979, duty officers at 4 command centers
(NORAD HQ, SAC Command Post, The Pentagon National Military Command Center, and the Alternate National Military Command Center)
all saw on their displays a pattern showing a large number of Soviet Missiles in a full scale attack on the U.S.A. During
the next 6 minutes emergency preparations for retaliation were made. A number of Air Force planes were launched, including
the President's National Emergency Airborne Command Post, though without the President! The President had not been informed,
perhaps because he could not be found.
No attempt was made to use the hot line either to ascertain the Soviet
intentions or to tell the Soviets the reasons for U.S. actions. This seems to me to have been culpable negligence. The whole
purpose of the "Hot Line" was to prevent exactly the type of disaster that was threatening at that moment.
With commendable speed, NORAD was able to contact PAVE PAWS early warning
radar and learn that no missiles had been reported. Also, the sensors on the satellites were functioning that day and had
detected no missiles. In only 6 minutes the threat assessment conference was terminated.
The reason for the false alarm was an exercise tape running on the computer
system. U.S. Senator Charles Percy happened to be in NORAD HQ at the time and is reported to have said there was absolute
panic. A question was asked in Congress. The General Accounting Office conducted an investigation, and an off-site testing
facility was constructed so that test tapes did not in the future have to be run on a system that could be in military operation.
19) June , 1980: Faulty Computer Chip
The Warning displays at the Command Centers mentioned in the last episode
included windows that normally showed
0000 ICBMs detected 0000 SLBMs detected
At 2:25 a.m. on June 3, 1980, these displays started showing various
numbers of missiles detected, represented by 2's in place of one or more 0's. Preparations for retaliation were instituted,
including nuclear bomber crews staring their engines, launch of Pacific Command's Airborne Command Post, and readying of Minutemen
missiles for launch. It was not difficult to assess that this was a false alarm because the numbers displayed were not rational.
While the cause of that false alarm was still being investigated 3 days
later, the same thing happened and again preparations were made for retaliation. The cause was a single faulty chip that was
failing in a random fashion. The basic design of the system was faulty, allowing this single failure to cause a deceptive
display at several command posts.
The following incident is added to illustrate that even now, when the
Cold War has been over for 8 years errors can still cause concern. This particular one could have hardly brought nuclear retaliation.;
but there are still 30,000 nuclear weapons deployed, and two nuclear weapon states could get into a hostile adversarial status
20) January, 1995: Russian False Alarm
On January 25, 1995, the Russian early warning radar’s detected
an unexpected missile launch near Spitzbergen. The estimated flight time to Moscow was 5 minutes. The Russian President, the
Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff were informed. The early warning and the control and command center switched to combat
mode. Within 5 minutes, the radar’s determined that the missile's impact would be outside the Russian borders.
The missile was Norwegian, and was launched for scientific measurements.
ON January 16, Norway had notified 35 countries including Russia that the launch was planned. Information had apparently reached
the Russian Defense Ministry, but failed to reach the on-duty personnel of the early warning system.
See article in Scientific American by Bruce G. Blair, Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N. von Hippel
Comment and Note On Probability
The probability of actual progression to nuclear war on any one of the
occasions listed may have been small, due to planned "fail-safe" features had failed. However, the accumulation of small probabilities
of disaster from a long sequence of risks add up to serious danger.
There is no way of telling what the actual level of risk was in these
mishaps but if the chance of disaster in every one of the 20 incidents had been only 1 in 100, it is mathematical fact that
the chance of surviving al 20 would have been 82%, i.e. about the same as the chance of surviving a single pull of the trigger
at Russian roulette played with a 6 shooter. With a similar series of mishaps on the Soviet side: another pull of the trigger.
If the risk in some of the events had been as high as 1 in 10, then the chance of surviving just seven such events would have
been less than 50:50.
BMEWS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CINC: Commander in Chief
DEFCON: Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON 5 is the peacetime state;
DEFCON 1 is a maximum war readiness).
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (land based)
KGB: Soviet Secret Police and Intelligence
NORAD: North American Air Defense Command
PAVE PAWS: Precision Acquisition of Vehicle Entry Phased-Array Warning
SAC: Strategic Air Command
SIOP: Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
Britten, Stewart: The Invisible Event, (London: Menard Press,
Calder, Nigel: Nuclear Nightmares, (London: British Broadcasting
Peace Research Reviews, vol. ix: 4, 5 (1984); vol. x: 3, 4 (1986) (Dundas, ON.: Peace Research Institute, Dundas).
Sagan, Scott D.: The Limits of Safety, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, (1993).